Lyman B. Kirkpatrick Jr. Quotes


The Agency became so wrapped up in the military operation that it failed to appraise the chances of success realistically. Furthermore, it failed to keep the national policymakers adequately and realistically informed of the conditions considered essential for success.


Context

The Bay of Pigs


Citations

Lyman B. Kirkpatrick Jr., *-1995, Inspector General CIA, The Inspector General's Survey of the Cuban Operation

Sourced by: Eigen's Political and Historical Quotations

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There was no national uprising. Not a single Cuban came to assist the Bay of Pigs invaders, nor was there even one sabotage action or other revolutionary action anywhere in Cuba. The conviction of the CIA that Castro was hated by the Cubans and the overwhelming majority of Cubans would welcome an invasion was so completely wrong that it was stunning. The assurances the CIA planners had received that there would be an uprising came from Cuban anti-Castro émigrés who were being paid by the CIA to organize the invasion force. They would only continue to get paid if the American authorities felt that there was a very good chance of success so they turned out to have a serious conflict of interest. But the CIA planners had been hearing this from Cuban exiles not involved with the invasion and they had a strong bias that no communist government could be a popular one. It was a great illustration of the fact that experienced professional intelligence analysts and operatives are susceptible to self-delusion and confusing wishful thinking with reality.


The “Principals Committee” is the senior interagency forum for consideration of policy issues affecting national security. It includes the National Security Director (Chair), the CIA Director, the Secretary of Defense and his Deputy, the Secretary of State and his Deputy, the Chairman of the Jount Chief’s of Staff, The Special Representative to the United Nations and other staff as invited. Clarke was almost always invited to these meeting when terrorism was discussed but he did not have a vote. This is a very important quotation for several reasons. First, it shows the influence that the Defense Department and CIA leaders had with President Bush before the 9-11 attack. It also illustrates dramatically how reluctant our military and CIA were to use drones. It was President Obama who overruled them and changed America policy to use Drones to protect American interests. It also indicates how there was a split regarding the perception of the danger of Al Qaeda and bin Laden with Clark and some of the other Principals placing more value on a military strike than the military and covert action leaders. This is not uncommon despite the fact that public perception is that it is always the military leaders who are the hawks. Also, it illustrates the problem of allowing the military point of view to always prevail in national policy making involving use of force. See {639322}.


Dulles was a master at manipulating presidents. Instead of just presenting his Bay of Pigs plan to Kennedy and assuring him of his belief in its likely success, Dulles brought in the comparison with Eisenhower, a great general with extensive foreign policy experience. If Ike would give the go ahead with a lesser success probability plan, then it showed the confidence that Eisenhower had in Dulles and the Central Intelligence Agency staff. If Kennedy were to kill the Bay of Pigs plan, then either he did not have the courage that Ike had or he was substituting his military judgment for Eisenhower’s. Kennedy approved the operation which was a terrible example of military planning. Kennedy, after the Bay of Pigs Debacle, never again had great confidence in the professional military and espionage. Many political scientists and historians credit this negative experience with the Bay of Pigs with giving Kennedy the confidence to not follow the recommendations of the leading military and intelligence staff when faced with the Cuban Missile Crises—even when members of the Joint Chief’s of Staff (Curtis LeMay was the most forceful) told him unequivocally that his failure to act more forcefully would likely weaken if not destroy the independence of the country. President Kennedy and his brother, Bobby, took a much more proactive role in the Missile Crises than they did in the Bay of Pigs.


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