Ezra Pound Quotes
I think an alliance with Stalin's Russia is rotten.
Pound, Ezra. Ezra Pound Speaking: Radio Speeches of World War II. Greenwood Press, 1978, p. 143.
Truman had to deal with Stalin for many years and over time he became more and more soured on the Russians. See {626411} for his view 22 years later,
The then Attorney General had established a back channel to the Russian agent. There was genuine fear by the Russians and some in America that there were still many Nazis and German nationalists who would try and influence, if not take over, German politics to produce another aggressive German fascist state. The Russians had lost 22 million citizens to the Germans in the war and had faced a defeated Germany where virtually every German over the age of 30 had been cheering for and supporting Hitler a decade ago. Neither the Russians nor we and the other allies had not yet seen the remarkable turn-around that the German nation would make and the intense anti-fascist, non-military ethos that would be brought by the younger German generations. The direction of Germany was then very unpredictable.
Nasser was indeed planning an attack. Israeli intelligence had discovered it, and the Israeli’s informed President Lyndon Johnson who in turn called Kosygin. Nasser and the Arabs had miscalculated again and ended up being not only defeated in the war they wanted but totally embarrassed by the incredibly poor performance of the Arab armies who greatly outnumbered the Israelis but had no stomach for a fight.
At the end of WWII there was much tension between Russia and the Anglo-American alliance. This plan was developed but never implemented. See {613195} for Prime Minister Winston Churchill’s description of the invasion idea.
In 1945 a message was sent to Joseph Stalin from the Japanese purportedly authorized by the Emperor asking the Russians to receive a peace envoy to discuss possible terms for a Japanese surrender. A prince of the imperial household was proposed as the emissary. The allies had already agreed and announced that unconditional surrender was the only alternative, but Stalin and the Russian Foreign Office thought that there might be some advantage gained to have the meeting. However there was one problem that the Japanese had never considered. When Stalin told Truman of the initiative, Truman agreed that no one should meet him.
Misha Saakashvili, the President of Georgia, the ex-Soviet State, had a good bit of support in American political circles and decided to start a military conflict with Russia attacking a disputed area whose people had rejected Georgia and preferred the Russian affiliation and control. He was confident that the US would protect him from major retaliation. The Russians first moved troops into the attacked area and then started attacking Georgia military assets. Rice and the Russian Foreign minister were negotiating a cease fire on which they agreed to details and were going to impose them on Georgia. However, Lavrov demanded that Georgia President Saakashvili be deposed. Either nation had the power to do this, and both had in many past instances deposed or overthrown the leaders of other nations—democratically elected or not. This quote is very interesting because in this particular case the United States was stating its idealistic policy and not its “real-politic: that it exhibited in helping to bring down and depose democratically elected in Iran, Chile, Vietnam, Venezuela, Haiti, and others. Ironically, there were many in the US who wanted Saakashvili deposed for unilaterally starting a military conflict Russia that had to involve the U. S.
The existing treaties of many of the different European countries like the NATO Treaty obliged them to assist their allies if they were involved in war. Once Austria attacked Serbia, Russia had to assist Serbia against Austria. Germany then joined with Austria and that triggered the treaty whereby France had to support Russia. And when Germany overran Belgium to attack France, England was obligated to come to Belgium’s defense. The only country that had planned for and wanted war was Germany who used her obligation to Austria as the excuse to implement her war plans (see {642092}). The entire Western World was at war when all but one nation wanted to avoid war. The communications and diplomacy of the time could not keep up with events and one of the worst wars in history ensued.
Like many in the 1920s, Dewar saw the Communist Soviet Union as the biggest potential risk to peace. However, although the Russian leaders constantly castigated the West, they did not have a large military, and were for the most part highly anti-war as they saw war as the product of Capitalistic competition and the tool of the aristocracy. They had little military equipment and almost no training or officer corps with which to build any Army. Germany in contrast had the skill, experience, officers, a history of aggression, and huge resentment over what they considered their humiliating WWI defeat and peace terms. They would start WWII, not Russia.
Ironically, at the time she wrote this column, Mrs. Roosevelt was being accused of being a communist by some Southerners who associated her strong views against racism and segregation. Some in the North thought she was a communist because of her active role in the New Deal, Yet here she was, willing to use military force to prevent Soviet expansion.
This quotation illustrates White’s extreme naivety about Stalinist Russia. At the time the Soviet Union had been backing communist insurgencies blatantly in China, Greece, and Korea for example. Most historians agree that White passed classified information to the Russians. He was accused of being a Communist, but there was never any evidence of that. Some people believe that he was a spy for the Russians and committed espionage, but others disagree observing that White was very much his own man and felt that much information that was classified never should have been. White substituted his own judgment, it is believed, about what could be given to the Russians. He was an admirer of what Russian socialism had accomplished economically, educationally and medically since the 1917 revolution deposing the Czar. Russia had been a valuable military ally, which had taken the brunt of both military and civilian casualties in WWII. White’s economics were certainly not Marxist but very much Keynesian. He was subpoenaed by the House Un-American Activities Committee where he was accused of being a Communist which he denied (see {634907}). He died of a heart attack 3 days later.
The immediate crisis had been averted and no more nuclear missiles would enter Cuba. But we had no leverage to get the few that were already there removed and it would be politically very difficult for the Kennedy administration to get the public to accept ANY nuclear missiles in Cuba. Hence, Stevenson’s statement. See {634554}. Neither side had great intercontinental ballistic missile capability at the time, and we had placed a large battery of missiles in Turkey very close to the Russian border. This gave the U. S. a major military advantage. We could deliver many more nuclear warheads to Russia than they could to the United States. The Russians with this proposal hoped to even the capability. The military advisers and the security and State Department advisors all thought that the U. S. should not give up its nuclear superiority. However, we had no international legal basis for denying the Cubans the right to locate any weapons on their soil, so to prevent the Communists from having nuclear missiles in Cuba we would have to use force which could easily escalate into a nuclear war. Kennedy and McCone both thought that since we had intercontinental ballistic missiles in production and coming on line and would not need the Turkey Missiles to strike all over Russia. So giving up our missile advantage for a short time would not expose us to any undue risk. The other advisors worried that the production of the ICBMs could be delayed—weapons systems were (and are) notoriously longer in production than estimated or planned. They also thought that the morale of the military and civilian population would suffer when they learned that we had given away our military advantage. There was a macho element in their thinking in that we would be giving in to intimidation and look like we were afraid to fight. Last, the political advisors thought that the right wing hawks would pillory the administration for its cowardice in allowing itself to be intimidated by the Russians. Their doctrine was that when faced with force, the Communists will always back down. In the final deal we agreed to remove our missiles from Turkey in 6 months and this would be done in complete secrecy and the Russians would keep the deal secret. That way, Kennedy got 6 more months of production which turned out to have been enough. The public would never know till years later and the Conservatives would not be able to publicly castigate Kennedy. Meanwhile, the conservatives would continue to believe that the Russians backed down in the face of force—the naval blockade as this was ‘proved’ their doctrine when the Russians had not backed down at all. The strategy and tactics of the Kennedy administration are still analyzed and argued about today with many Americans just realizing that we did not intimidate the Russians with force or the threat of force to remove their Cuban missiles.
Ezra Weston Loomis Pound was an expatriate American poet and critic, a major figure in the early modernist poetry movement, and a fascist collaborator in Italy during World War II. His works include Ripostes (1912), Hugh Selwyn Mauberley (1920), and his 800-page epic poem, The Cantos (c. 1917–1962).