Tim Weiner Quotes


For 13 years, from Nixon’s era to the dying days of the Cold War, every estimate of Soviet strategic forces overstated the rate at which Moscow was modernizing its weaponry.


Context

Nixon, when he took office, berated the CIA Director in front of the entire National Security Staff for underestimating Soviet Military capability. His intense pressure caused the CIA to go through a period where they constantly overestimated Russian capability and intentions. They found that most politicians preferred a serious threat rather than be accused of spending so much of the government’s budget—roughly half—for Defense.


Citations

Tim Weiner, Intelligence Historian, Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA, 2007

Sourced by: Eigen's Political and Historical Quotations

Related Quotes

3 days later, President Truman, announced that the Russians had successfully developed an atomic weapon. This quotation gives us another example where the Central Intelligence Agency failed to predict and/or warn America about a crucial event. Others included the North Korean invasion of South Korea, the Arab Spring, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the fall of the Berlin wall, and the collapse of the Soviet Union.


This was one of the great blunders of the Central Intelligence Agency in American History. As the Central Intelligence Agency was writing this report the Russians were landing missile components in Cuba. Within days the Cuban Missile Crisis would erupt. The Central Intelligence Agency also missed the Communist Takeover in China, the fall of the Berlin wall, the implosion of the Soviet Union, the Hungarian Revolution, the Iran Revolution, the Russian invasion of Afghanistan, and the Arab Spring just to list a few of the most dramatic events about which they failed to have any information in advance. At the same time they claimed that there were nuclear weapons in Iraq leading to the Iraq war and claimed the Soviets were on a track to have a better military and stronger economy—see {635791}.


The U. S. Counterintelligence team identified several KGB agents who were stealing American technology in various forms. Gus W. Weiss of the National Security Staff devised a plan where instead of arresting the Russian agents, FBI agents posed as mid-level science and technology workers who could be bribed to turn over American technology. Then they provided technology that did not work which the Soviets then proceeded to engineer and fabricate the techniques which never worked correctly. By the time the Russians found out they had wasted much effort and money at spying and engineering.


The alternative deterrent was to maintain an army of over 2 million men overseas in both Europe and Asia, and the cost was much greater than the then perceived cost of nuclear weapons. At the time no one figured the cost of coping with the radioactive material and waste as well as the cleanup of nuclear bomb factories like Hanford. These costs were still not known byt the 21st century.


Kennedy was then a Senator with an eye on the White House. No such missile gap existed, and when Kennedy was elected President, he had the problem of public expectation for a problem which did njot exist, but he had been instrumental in creating.


Several weeks before the Russians launched Sputnik, our team at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory asked permission to place a rocket in orbit around the Earth. We could to it with two days of preparation. We had been doing experiments with 2 stage rockets to test materials and designs for nose-cones returning from space. We launched rockets straight up. At the maximum height we turned it around and fired the second stage to drive it straight back to Earth so it could achieve the speed of an object returning from space. We were developing more and more powerful second stage rockets. We had just calculated that our newest second stage had more than enough thrust to, after the ascent, turn the rocket at right angles to the perpendicular, and fire the rocket into orbit around the earth. We could do this easily. The military were initially very enthusiastic. America could be the first nation that put a satellite in orbit. However, the authorities in Washington, not only refused us permission to try, but postponed a number of our regular launches and forbade us from talking to anyone about our capability or request for our experiment.. When Sputnik was launched into orbit a few weeks later, we were really puzzled. No one ever explained why Washington had refused us permission, but we came up with a theory: The issue of the legality under international law of one country having its satellite in orbit over another country’s airspace was not at all settled. If we did satellite reconnaissance in the future over the Soviet Union, the Russians could claim that was an act of war. And we had extensive plans to create such satellites and launch them when we solved all the technical problems in the future. We believe that the authorities knew that the Russians were about to launch Sputnik. By allowing them to be the first to launch, it would be they—not us—who would be setting the precedent of sending satellites over other nation’s airspace and claiming this was not aggression or an act of war as they thought they were way ahead of us. In addition, after WWII, President Eisenhower was having difficulty getting Congress to spend money on rocketry and satellites as well as science and technology including science and mathematics education which was then terrible in America. So allowing the Russians to “beat us” the administration had the issue that they needed, and they allowed the Russians to set the legal precedents that they would have opposed if we were ahead of them and orbited a satellite first. Either President Eisenhower and his team were brilliantly shrewd or they were pretty dumb because we easily could have put our rockets in orbit then.


Dr. Snyder was the youngest physicist at Los Alamos working on the Atom Bomb Manhattan Project. His rocketry skill was used to fire probes into the highly radioactive area to obtain samples and measurements immediately after the test bomb was exploded.


This was an amazing prediction for the time. Most Europeans were not sure that the United States would even survive, and Russia was looked upon as the most backward nation in Europe. By the middle of the 20th century—over 100 years after Tocqueville wrote this—The United States and Russia were the two superpowers of the world.


Russia then had designs on Afghani Territory. About a century later, Russia Invaded Afghanistan and tried to impose a communist government. It failed and the Afghans drove out the Russians.


At the time the USSR was our ally. Neither the military or the state department focused in gaining intelligence on any ally and J. Edgar Hoover had for years focused on intelligence about communists in the United States but not in Russia and the rest of the world. These other agencies treated Souers with disdain or ignored him, but this memo showed the importance of Truman’s idea of having an independent intelligence agency to inform the President.


Tim Weiner
Tim Weiner
  • Born: June 20, 1956
  • Nationality:
  • Profession: Journalist, Author

Tim Weiner is an American reporter and author. He is the author of five books and co-author of a sixth, and winner of the Pulitzer Prize and National Book Award. His newest book is The Folly and the Glory: America, Russia, and Political Warfare, 1945–2020