TIM WEINER

The CIA has never denied this, and it seems to be corroborated in that none of the CIA reports to the Presidents ever mentioned the failures and there is no CIA official who ever claimed that they informed either of the Presidents. In particular, when Kennedy initially went along with the ill-fated CIA Bay of Pigs invasion plan not realizing that the CIA had a dismal record of major misjudgments and failures of covert operations.

Nixon, when he took office, berated the CIA Director in front of the entire National Security Staff for underestimating Soviet Military capability. His intense pressure caused the CIA to go through a period where they constantly overestimated Russian capability and intentions. They found that most politicians preferred a serious threat rather than be accused of spending so much of the government’s budget—roughly half—for Defense.

Allan Dulles was a long time Director of the CIA.

This was a critical shortcoming in that the NSA had the personnel for electronic intelligence. It was the major job of the CIA to place human agents—abroad—who could act as spies and/or recruit or manage spies.

The CIA has never denied this, and it seems to be corroborated in that none of the CIA reports to the Presidents ever mentioned the failures and there is no CIA official who ever claimed that they informed either of the Presidents. In particular, when Kennedy initially went along with the ill-fated CIA Bay of Pigs invasion plan not realizing that the CIA had a dismal record of major misjudgments and failures of covert operations.

This was a critical shortcoming in that the NSA had the personnel for electronic intelligence. It was the major job of the CIA to place human agents—abroad—who could act as spies and/or recruit or manage spies.

Allan Dulles was a long time Director of the CIA.

Nixon, when he took office, berated the CIA Director in front of the entire National Security Staff for underestimating Soviet Military capability. His intense pressure caused the CIA to go through a period where they constantly overestimated Russian capability and intentions. They found that most politicians preferred a serious threat rather than be accused of spending so much of the government’s budget—roughly half—for Defense.