Mark Blyth Quotes


The people who generated great personal wealth in the process of creating this mess [the Great Recession]—bankers and financiers who invented products like mortgage-backed securities and credit default swaps—are now actively eschewing any responsibility for that problem by blaming the state for their mistakes.


Citations

Mark Blyth, Political Scientist, Quoted in Brown Alumni Magazine, November – December 2013

Sourced by: Eigen's Political and Historical Quotations

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Volker was trying to reform the excesses of the banking industry in the aftermath of the Great Recession where the banks had to be bailed out by the American taxpayers.


When the Meltdown hit America, the crisis drew attention to the fiscal solvency and stability of banks in most of the world. The Irish banks were much more overextended than those of most counties and when that came to light there was a bank panic in Ireland. Ahern and the Irish Dail (parliament) decided to bail out the Irish bank at a very great cost to the rest of the Irish economy and people. He believed if Lehman Brothers had been bailed out, as America did with other institutions, the Irish bank bubble would not have burst. It is not known whether he actually meant to use the word “testicles” or he made a gaff intending to use the word “tentacles”. Both have relevant meaning in the situation with a significant shade of difference in meaning between the two.


Economic is often called “the dismal science” as its ability to make predictions has never been very good. The Great Depression was also missed, else it would not have come as such a shock. There have been a few economists who correctly predicted these economic downturns but they generally continuously predict recessions and depressions that never happen.


Moody’s and Standard & Poors, the 2 largest credit rating agencies, gave A ratings to securities that had packaged terrible F-rated, toxic, subprime mortgages, and gotten the credit ratings agencies to rate them as A on the theory that the risk was diversified. Each new security like this that a bank put out was submitted informally to one of the credit rating agencies to “discuss”. If the agency “concluded” that they could give it an A rating, they received a very large fee. If not, the bank would not officially submit the security and not pay anything. That almost never happened with these packages of subprime mortgages.


U. S. Treasury Secretary Larry Summers called Rajan a “Luddite” for this view, but what Rajan observed and predicted was exactly what happened in the Meltdown of 2008 which led to the Great Recession. Rajan was one of the few economists to call this right. Several, invested their own money assuming a crash and made billions. Most, like Summers and the Federal Reserve Chairmen in retrospect admitted that they missed the signs and didn’t connect the dots. See {637168}, {637987}, and {620038}


Born thought that her agency was responsible for regulating the new esoteric financial products—derivatives including credit default swaps—for otherwise there would be no regulation at all of financial products that could dwarf the stock and bond market. Summers persuaded her to back off. When the Meltdown of 2008 hit, the huge derivative exposure of the large banks and some insurance companies was so great that it was one of the major causes for the meltdown of the entire banking system. Summers, normally a great economist not only called this one wrong, but later, along with most other government and private economists ignored a very explicit warning—See {637168}, {637986}, and {620038}.


Geithner, the Treasury Secretary immediately after the Meltdown of 2008, facing complete collapse of our financial system, among other ameliorations, advocated and implemented many subsidies to bail out the banks most of whom had been greedy, foolish and often dishonest. He even allowed banks to use taxpayer money to pay bonuses to Bank executives who had brought the bank to ruin being a cause of the crisis. However, the banks not only survived but recovered and made huge profits while many of the taxpayers whose funds were used to help the banks were still struggling to make ends meet and it was they who received little, if any, government assistant.


She had warned about the unregulated derivatives 10 years earlier, but to no avail. See {637987}. Then when she had been proven prescient in the Meltdown of 2008, Congress was more interested in how she thought they could prevent future problems with derivatives. Some were adopted but not all. The financial institutions claimed that they needed derivatives to hedge positions and hence “stabilize” the system. Of the members of Congress who voted on this issue, almost none understood derivatives and credit default swaps were and how they worked. But some were sure they were bad, and others were sure that they were necessary for stability. Derivatives can, and did, get so complicated that the people who originally created them sometimes cannot tell whether they are at risk or not. Even computer cannot calculate the value and risks of these instruments because the values and risks depend on what happens to other companies or instruments which themselves have derivatives insuring them. See {620038} for a good description of the difficulty.


Mark Blyth
Mark Blyth
  • Born: September 29, 1967
  • Nationality: British, American
  • Profession:

Mark McGann Blyth is a Scottish-American political scientist and a professor of international economics at Brown University.