Stability Operations Quotes

Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and the war on terrorism have reduced the pace of military transformation and have revealed our lack of preparation for defensive and stability operations. This Administration has overextended our military.

When the United States first went into Afghanistan in 2001, it devastated the Taliban and Al Qaeda in a matter of weeks using only a few hundred C.I.A. and Special Operations personnel, backed by American air power. Later, when the United States transitioned to conventional Pentagon stability operations, this success was reversed.

No one is talking about occupying Iraq for five to ten years.

I don't think our troops ought to be used for what's called nation building.

[Afghanistan and Iraq] are still countries that are fragile enough that we're gonna have to partner with them in some way.

Iraq and Afghanistan are now democracies and they are allies in the cause of freedom and peace.

I'm a believer in the Afghan people, so I support an increase in forces there.

We've been able to build up the Afghan security forces and stabilize it.

I would hope that we have in place the adequate resources to become an army of occupation because you’re going to walk into chaos

[Our troops in Iraq and Afganistan] does give us the ability to make sure that we are strengthening those folk who are interested in building up their countries rather than destroying them, and doing so in a way that is sustainable and doesn't put a constant burden on the amazing men and women that we've got in uniform.

To maintain order after Assad's fall would require at least 500,000 troops in a never-ending occupation.

There has been a good deal of comment — some of it quite outlandish — about what our postwar requirements might be in Iraq. Some of the higher end predictions we have been hearing recently, such as the notion that it will take several hundred thousand U.S. troops to provide stability in post- Iraq, are wildly off the mark. It is hard to conceive that it would take more forces to provide stability in post-Saddam Iraq than it would take to conduct the war itself and to secure the surrender of Saddam's security forces and his army — hard to imagine.

We've got to ensure that the quality and the capability of these forces will be good enough to withstand the challenges that the insurgents and the terrorists will present to the new Iraqi government.