Capital Structure Quotes

Unfortunately, our stock is somehow not well understood by the markets. The market compares us with generic companies. We need to look at Biocon as a bellwether stock. A stock that is differentiated, a stock that is focused on R&D, and a very, very strong balance sheet with huge value drivers at the end of it.

Companies typically borrow money at less than their return on equity and therefore compound their return at the expense of lenders.

What happened after publication of our paper was that, for the next 40 years, people said, all right, we now know the answer to the capital structure question under ideal conditions.

Again two manufacturers may employ the same amount of fixed, and the same amount of circulating capital; but the durability of their fixed capitals may be very unequal.

The transaction cost approach maintains that some projects are easy to finance by debt and ought to be financed by debt. These are projects for which physical-asset specificity is low to moderate.

We've always been modestly leveraged, and we've never believed in a great deal of leverage on either our private equity business or on our investment banking business. And I think it really goes back to my uncle and dad growing up in the Depression and just seeing what happened to people who were overly levered.

The most important word in the world of money is cash flow. The second most important word is leverage.

As well as, we know, as a real estate developer, [Donald Trump] has hundreds of millions of dollars in debt, in loans.

Capital structure isn't an eyeshade economic thing: It's about your ability to protect your workforce and your service levels.

You, as an entrepreneur, must make sure the postmoney valuation is a number you can obtain. You don't want too high of a valuation.

Venture capitalists are professional money managers. We are provided capital to invest as long as we can return it to our investors with a strong return in a reasonable amount of time. A strong return is three times cash on cash. A reasonable amount of time is ten years max.

You know, when the cost of capital goes down, when credit becomes cheap, people start taking greater and greater risks.

Less than a year after loading the company up with debt, Romney and Bain gave themselves bonuses four times bigger than the $8 million they had put into the deal.

Balance sheets bore me. I suspect if figures had excited me I would have gone into the city and now be a lot wealthier.

But NESV has always had debt from the first day we purchased the Red Sox. We have some partners who look at Internal Rate of Return (IRR) and almost demand that we have debt as a consequence.

If you're running a business for the long term, the last thing you should be doing is borrowing money to buy back stock.

You have to have in mind what you want when you go public. It's not just an end in and of itself. Suddenly, you have investors to satisfy. Investors who want - who demand - a return.

Keep a strong balance sheet, don't get over-leveraged, and try to protect the security of your employees.

Manchester United and Liverpool have been bought with huge leverage, and we've got Roman Abramovich at Chelsea who can turn his loans into shares. It is really important for the Premier League to ask itself: if a club is being bought on such a mountain of debt, isn't that a possible recipe for disaster for the future?

Legislative reforms in the 1990s and the public/private structure led managements to expand the GSEs' balance sheets to enormous size, underpinned by wafer-thin slivers of capital, driving high shareholder returns and very high compensation for management.

When you're levered 9 to 1, it'd be unreal for a bank to go down.

The best thing is to go public only when you're absolutely sure that's the right move for the company. And in order to make sure that is the case, you need to have as much control over the company as possible, which means not giving up control early on.

I had some of the students in my finance class actually do some empirical work on capital structures, to see if we could find any obvious patterns in the data, but we couldn't see any.

And make sure that capital structure we have in place is the right capital structure. I think that's the reason that we've been successful.

Mea culpa, mea culpa. MIT and Wharton and University of Chicago created the financial engineering instruments, which, like Samson and Delilah, blinded every CEO. They didn't realize the kind of leverage they were doing and they didn't understand when they were really creating a real profit or a fictitious one.