George Elsey Quotes

Bethe and other European refugees joined American and British scientists at Los Alamos, NM, for the development of the atomic bomb.

Ironically, the Japanese Government and military were so polarized that it took several days for the authorities to get together and agree on a course of surrender action. The second atomic bomb dropped on Nagasaki speeded things up.

The second atomic bomb had just been dropped.

Truman had been briefed on the number of Japanese who committed suicide rather than surrender—including civilians—in Saipan, Okinawa, Iwo Jima, and other locations where United States troops had invaded. He and his experts agreed that the Japanese would not surrender unless there was a new dramatic factor that was outside the usual thinking—the atomic bomb. He was proved right about the warning. Not only did the Japanese ignore it, but they did not even surrender after the nuclear devastation at Hiroshima. It took a second bomb dropped on Nagasaki to motivate the surrender. So even a demonstration with all those Japanese casualties did not cause the surrender until it was repeated.

It was this directive, together with the evidence of its acceptance by the Japanese soldier fighting to the death in Saipan and Okinawa, that lead President Truman and Chief of Staff Marshall to conclude that more lives would be saved by using the atomic bomb than invading the Japanese mainland. See {641063}

Shortly thereafter the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima. To this day there is historical debate over whether Japan received enough notice to afford them the opportunity to surrender or whether their cultural imperatives would allow surrender under almost any circumstances. This Japanese rejection of the surrender demand, seems so reckless in retrospect. Even after the second atomic bomb drop, most senior officers of Japan did not want to surrender. Even after the Emperor decided on surrender, there was an unsuccessful coup attempt of officers totally opposed to surrender.

Although generally a right wing conservative, Clark today sounds like almost like an extreme leftist on the issue. At the time however, many thought that he had taken leave of his senses. He not only was completely contrary to bipartisan national policy but opposed by almost universal American public opinion. He is one of the very few significant American officials to oppose the war policies.

A few Americans who were too young to remember WWII hav in retrospect questioned the use of the Atomic Bomb against Japan. Young Japanese feel even stronger on this point. This quotation is very important because it comes for a senior Japanese official who knew the conditions at the time.

This was one of several petitions that were sent to the President by groups of scientists who were working on the development of the atomic bomb. The major objective of the scientists was to demonstrate the power of the bomb before it was used. The President did not select this policy of demonstration as the invasion of the Japanese mainland was imminent and America only had two bombs—one a uranium and the other, plutonium. If the demonstration would not produce the unconditional surrender, then there would only be one weapon left and it would take months to produce another. This was the strongest argument against using up a bomb. It was somewhat borne out when the Japanese did not surrender after the first bomb had been dropped on Hiroshima. It took the second.

This quotation is important because the American public and their leaders saw only one course of action—invasion of the Japanese Mainland. The debate was whether to attempt the invasion right away or bomb and blockade Japan into destruction and starvation weakening the population so their resistance would not produce the kind of casualties that we had experienced with the Invasion of Okinawa. The bombing and blockade strategy was selected and 80 percent of Tokyo was obliterated. Yet the Japanese refused to surrender even after all its manufacturing capability was destroyed and the agriculture was beginning to be destroyed. Most Americans did not realize it but the atomic bomb was being made ready for use. After the test bomb in New Mexico, we had enough fissionable material for 2 bombs and it would take several months for each additional bomb. The use of the atomic bomb at the time seemed not much different from the massive bombing that had already taken place. More Japanese were killed in some of these conventional bombings than with the Atomic Bomb. The key believe was that the Japanese would not give up. After the first A bomb, they still would not surrender, and when the Emperor decided on surrender after the 2nd bomb, there was a military insurrection in the palace to stop the Emperor’s surrender message to the people from being broadcast. It was just minutes too late, and the Emperor had to be obeyed. Invasion, with its terrible casualties—many more than the atomic bombs—was unnecessary.

The note was found in an abandoned Japanese camp on Bataan. There are some who believe that this note was a forgery. However, most think it genuine as it reflected one of the Japanese
“aces in the hole” to defend against an allied invasion of the Japanese mainland. It was one of the reasons that some American planners advocated use of the Atomic Bomb. Of course that was a real risk of using the bomb. The Japanese might be so angry and feel morally abused and kill the many allied prisoners they had. Many thought it was a lesser risk because it did not have the symbolic animus that foreigners occupying the Japanese homeland had. The quotation illustrates the amazing complexity that the American and allied leadership faced trying to end WWII in the Pacific.

There were some doubts the scientists developed after Germany had surrendered as Hitler had been their greatest fear. So they were briefed on the planned invasion of the Japanese mainland and the military medical preparations for treating and caring for ½ million serious wounded casualties. In addition, given the state of war, there was expected about the same number of American Military deaths. On top of that, there would be many more Japanese military casualties plus even more Japanese civilian deaths and wounded. The use of the Atom Bomb would save all those lives but have casualties of its own, but far fewer. At the time, surprising to most people now, the use of the atomic bomb was not an issue of controversy at all. There were no Congressman who questioned it, no newspapers which editorialized against the use of the bomb. There were not even any other counties which protested its use.

The only soldier ever so honored. See {604732} for Japanese attitude toward surrender.