J. C. King Quotes

The use of U. S. regular armed forces to oppose the efforts of indigenous communist elements within foreign countries must generally be considered as a risky and profitless undertaking, apt to do more harm than good.

An insurgency is the most difficult to fight of all military activities.

White Paper has effectively exposed certain aspects of PBSUCCESS ... If possible, fabricate big human interest story, like flying saucers, birth sextuplets in remote area to take play away.

I received a telegram from Allen Dulles in which he stated in effect that the revolution could not have succeeded but for what I did.

We now prepared authorize bombing specific targets in [Guatemala City] area since you and feel this now the most effective move to achieve success. Targets should be selected with a view to having desired effect on army and regime morale with minimum political cost to [the United States].

Counter insurgency is something we can’t do, can’t do well, and shouldn’t be doing.

For we are opposed around the world by a monolithic and ruthless conspiracy that relies primarily on covert means for expanding its sphere of influence–on infiltration instead of invasion, on subversion instead of elections, on intimidation instead of free choice, on guerrillas by night instead of armies by day. It is a system which has conscripted vast human and material resources into the building of a tightly knit, highly efficient machine that combines military, diplomatic, intelligence, economic, scientific and political operations.  Its preparations are concealed, not published. Its mistakes are buried, not headlined. Its dissenters are silenced, not praised. No expenditure is questioned, no rumor is printed, no secret is revealed. It conducts the Cold War, in short, with a war-time discipline no democracy would ever hope or wish to match For we are opposed around the world by a monolithic and ruthless conspiracy that relies primarily on covert means for expanding its sphere of influence–on infiltration instead of invasion, on subversion instead of elections, on intimidation instead of free choice, on guerrillas by night instead of armies by day. It is a system which has conscripted vast human and material resources into the building of a tightly knit, highly efficient machine that combines military, diplomatic, intelligence, economic, scientific and political operations. Its preparations are concealed, not published. Its mistakes are buried, not headlined. Its dissenters are silenced, not praised. No expenditure is questioned, no rumor is printed, no secret is revealed. It conducts the Cold War, in short, with a war-time discipline no democracy would ever hope or wish to match.

The United States, acting within the constraints imposed by its traditions and public attitudes, cannot crush a revolutionary movement which is sufficiently large, dedicated, competent and well supported…. The structure of U. S. military power is ill-suited to cope with guerrilla warfare waged by a determined, resourceful, and politically astute opponent.

Mr. President, I stood right here at Ike’s desk and told him I was certain that our Guatemalan operation would succeed, and Mr. President, the prospect for this plan are even better than they were for that one.

On the Vietnam War: I've lived under situations where every decent man declared war first and I've lived under situations where you don't declare war. We've been flexible enough to kill people without declaring war.

There was the situation in Nicaragua where the Sandinistas had taken over a couple of years earlier. There was a civil war going on in El Salvador and there was a similar situation in Guatemala. So Honduras was in a rather precarious geographic position indeed.

You can't talk about defeating insurgencies in the same way that you can with a conventional army.

You know as well as I do that counterinsurgency is a very nuanced type of military operation.

The Sandinista government became consumed with fighting a war of survival. They were up against the biggest superpower in the world.

American failures in Vietnam and Iraq suggest that it's not really possible to create and sustain a proxy government in a country far from our own borders.

It cannot be too often reiterated that this Government does not possess the weapons which would be needed to enable it to meet head-on the threat to national independence presented by the communist elements in foreign countries. This poses an extremely difficult problem as to the measures which our Government can take to prevent the communists from achieving success in the countries where resistance is lowest.

Guerrilla warfare is essentially a political war.

If we were fighting an army, the work would be comparatively easy. We are fighting a secret revolutionary organization.

The Fifth Column.

Consider it highly important to mobilize anti-Communist activities of the Catholic Church dignitaries and of Catholic lay organizations.... This could be done, for instance, by describing graphically how the local church would be turned into a meeting hall for the "Fighting Godless," how the reader's children would have to spend their time with the "Red Pioneers," how the pictures of Lenin, Stalin and Malenkov would replace the pictures of the Saints in every home, and the like.

Controlled penetration of the Communist Party. Controlled penetrations in the armed forces Controlled penetrations in the major anti-Communist organizations Controlled penetrations of the major labor unions

The station will prepare a list of the 25 most dangerous Communists and pro-Communists and attempt to gather data re these targets which could be used for character assassination..... More pictures of comparisons of living conditions of the top Commies and the peons will be of special value.

Overruling the Joint Chiefs of staff, overruling the State Department, overruling the CIA, President Reagan Authorized providing Stinger Missiles to the Mujahedeen Afghanis.

I needed two sponsors. I met Phlek Phoeun, who I had known long before. He introduced me to Mao Say, who was a high CIA. They promised to support me in the election, on condition that “I accept their commands and accomplish missions given by the CIA”. In the end I consented to their requirements. From that time I was a CIA agent. They promised to promote me, and my activities were carried out in connection with Mao Say's from then on. Mao Say then assigned me to participate in two CIA newspapers: 1. Liberal People headed by contemptible Sim Va, a CIA. 2. Réalité Cambodgien managed by contemptible Bare (CIA). These two newspapers were against people, revolution, socialism, and communism. They were written in favor of U.S., capitalism, and imperialism.

If an officer is in pursuit [of guerrillas] he would be perfectly justified in retaliating on the farmers among whom they mingle. It is not our wish or policy to destroy the farmers or their farms, but of course there is and must be a remedy for all Evils, if the farmers of a neighborhood encourage or even permit in their midst a set of Guerrillas they cannot expect to escape the necessary consequences.... These principles of war and common sense should be made familiar to the people that they may clearly understand how ... they lay themselves clearly liable to all the risks of war without any of its excitement.