Stephen Kinzer Quotes
On Aug. 19, 1953, Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh of Iran became the first victim of a C.I.A. coup. Ten months later, on June 27, 1954, President Jacobo Arbenz of Guatemala became the second.
Kinzer, Stephen. All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror. John Wiley & Sons, 2003.
Mohammad Mosaddegh had been elected Prime Minister of Iraq. However, he was left leaning in the midst of the Cold War and some of our policy strategists thought that he could hurt the U. S. interests which were large there. Iran had huge oil reserves and American and British companies were active in operating the oil drilling and export. The new Prime Minister was threatening the British with oil nationalization to get a larger share of the oil revenue. The Shah, with CIA support, fired Mosaddegh, but that backfired and the Shah had to flee the country. This was when Smith sent this note to President Eisenhower. We were prepared to try and work with Mosaddegh. However, our chief ally did not agree and wanted to oust Mosaddegh. At the request of the British MI6 intelligence service, the CIA implemented a “spontaneous” coup d’etat to overthrow the popularly elected Iranian President Mohammad Mosaddegh. This enabled the Shah to return and take over. Ironically, although he was anti-Communist, he threatened the American and British Oil Companies and forced them to “renegotiate” their contracts with Iran and pay the Shah more money. The Shah was very unpopular with Iranians, and over the years the Iranians who opposed the Shah, blamed the United States for the fact that Mosaddegh had been overthrown and the Shah returned to power. See {637008} and {637007}.
Dulles was a master at manipulating presidents. Instead of just presenting his Bay of Pigs plan to Kennedy and assuring him of his belief in its likely success, Dulles brought in the comparison with Eisenhower, a great general with extensive foreign policy experience. If Ike would give the go ahead with a lesser success probability plan, then it showed the confidence that Eisenhower had in Dulles and the Central Intelligence Agency staff. If Kennedy were to kill the Bay of Pigs plan, then either he did not have the courage that Ike had or he was substituting his military judgment for Eisenhower’s. Kennedy approved the operation which was a terrible example of military planning. Kennedy, after the Bay of Pigs Debacle, never again had great confidence in the professional military and espionage. Many political scientists and historians credit this negative experience with the Bay of Pigs with giving Kennedy the confidence to not follow the recommendations of the leading military and intelligence staff when faced with the Cuban Missile Crises—even when members of the Joint Chief’s of Staff (Curtis LeMay was the most forceful) told him unequivocally that his failure to act more forcefully would likely weaken if not destroy the independence of the country. President Kennedy and his brother, Bobby, took a much more proactive role in the Missile Crises than they did in the Bay of Pigs.
This coup has been the biggest trauma for the Iranian people in the last centuries. The blowback from it, has soured relationships between America and Iran for decades. Khamenei personally was traumatized by the coup and publicly refers to it quite frequently. Ironically, reasons and policy logic for the CIA orchestration of the coup are even today murky. The desires of the British may well have been the main reason. “Arrogance” is the term Khamenei uses to describe the British-American alliance and their propensity to try and shape the affairs of other nations.
John E. Puerifoy, the American ambassador to Guatemala
This quotation would not be memorable but for the fact that one of the other “passengers” on that Central Intelligence Agency “train” was Saddam Hussein, who later became the dictator of Iraq and the enemy of the United States. This was a classic example of unintended consequences of covert operations. The Cia covertly put the Baath Party in power in Iran, and some years later, the Iraqi Baath Party became a major enemy of the United States.
Lumumba was too socialistic for Dulles. He was not only removed from power by a covert CIA operation but the allies we selected to succeed him, then murdered him as they feared they had no one to match Lumumba’s popularity with the people.
The “help” was a covert CIA 1954 operation that overthrew the government
Stephen Kinzer is an American author, journalist and academic. A former New York Times correspondent, he has published several books, and writes for several newspapers and news agencies.