CHARLES D. BROAD

When I see a colour or hear a sound, I am aware of something, and not of nothing.

It should now be clear why the method of Philosophy is so different from that of the natural sciences. Experiments are not made, because they would be utterly useless.

In Psychology we deal with minds and their processes, and leave out of account as far as possible the objects that we get to know by means of them.

The pure natural scientist is liable to forget that minds exist, and that if it were not for them he could neither know nor act on physical objects.

When we say that Philosophy tries to clear up the meanings of concepts we do not mean that it is simply concerned to substitute some long phrase for some familiar word.

It is clear that every immediate object of our senses both exists and is real in the primary meaning of these terms so long as we remain aware of the object.

Common sense says that chairs and tables exist independently of whether anyone happens to perceive them or not.

Our analysis of truth and falsehood, or of the nature of judgment, is not very likely to be influenced by our hopes and fears.

In all the sciences except Psychology we deal with objects and their changes, and leave out of account as far as possible the mind which observes them.

It is clear that every immediate object of our senses both exists and is real in the primary meaning of these terms so long as we remain aware of the object.

The pure natural scientist is liable to forget that minds exist, and that if it were not for them he could neither know nor act on physical objects.

It should now be clear why the method of Philosophy is so different from that of the natural sciences. Experiments are not made, because they would be utterly useless.

When we say that Philosophy tries to clear up the meanings of concepts we do not mean that it is simply concerned to substitute some long phrase for some familiar word.

In all the sciences except Psychology we deal with objects and their changes, and leave out of account as far as possible the mind which observes them.

Common sense says that chairs and tables exist independently of whether anyone happens to perceive them or not.

When I see a colour or hear a sound, I am aware of something, and not of nothing.

In Psychology we deal with minds and their processes, and leave out of account as far as possible the objects that we get to know by means of them.

Our analysis of truth and falsehood, or of the nature of judgment, is not very likely to be influenced by our hopes and fears.