Ideas cannot be fought except by means of better ideas. The battle consists, not of opposing, but of exposing; not of denouncing, but of disproving; not of evading, but of boldly proclaiming a full, consistent, and radical alternative.
By the worldly standards of public life, all scholars in their work are of course oddly virtuous. They do not make wild claims, they do not cheat. They do not try to persuade at any cost. They appeal neither to prejudice nor to authority ...
Half the world's troubles come from men not being trained to resent a fallacy as much as an insult.
I know that it is a hopeless undertaking to debate about fundamental value judgements. For instance, if someone approves, as a goal, the extirpation of the human race from the earth, one cannot refute such a viewpoint on rational grounds. But if there is agreement on certain goals and values, one can argue rationally about the means by which these objectives may be obtained.
I was home-schooled, was always very close with my mom, and was very straight-laced and square. I was never the rebellious one, and I never threw hissy fits. I was the type of person that would show a Powerpoint presentation about why I should do something versus crying and screaming over it.
I've slipped on occasion into the realm of irresponsible invective, but I try to avoid it and generally recant when I fall short. Because name-calling does nothing to improve understanding or move the political debate forward.
You can prove anything you want by coldly logical reason---if you pick the proper postulates.
The history of philosophy is to a great extent that of a certain clash of human temperaments.
Well, first of all, no professor should be able to say, I refuse to defend my position. I refuse to debate my position.
Political thinking consists in deciding upon the conclusion first and then finding good arguments for it. An open mind is considered irresponsible.
An argument can be logically valid, but unsound in that it contains a false premise and, therefore, leads to a false conclusion (e.g., Scientists are smart; smart people do not make mistakes; therefore, scientists do not make mistakes).
When we reason upon general subjects, one may justly affirm, that our speculations can scarce ever be too fine, provided they be just.
What counts as rational argumentation is as historically determined and as context-dependent, as what counts as good French.