James R. Clapper Quotes
I had served in the Republic of Korea in the early '80s while I was on active duty as a director of intelligence for U.S. forces Korea, and kind of followed developments on the peninsula ever since.
Clapper, James R. Interview by Charlie Rose. Charlie Rose, PBS, 2014.
This intelligence analysis turned out to predict exactly what happened. Less than 3 years after this report, the Communists overran South Korea and the Korean War began. See {584008} for another remarkable foreign policy prediction.
The Korean War armistice left a vulnerable border between North and South Korea and approximately 40,000 American troops were necessary for decades thereafter to protect the border.
The first has already occurred; the second is still an open question.
After the Second World War Japanese industry had mostly not yet been rebuilt from the destruction of the allied bombing. The automobile industry, which before the war had aspirations of worldwide competition had been reduced to one company making less than 1000 cars a year and not many more trucks. However, when the Korean War broke out, there was a need for many military vehicles to support the allied war effort. Japan being so close and having very low labor rates had the opportunity to supply many of the needed vehicles. This allowed Nissan, Toyota and Datsun to get on their industrial feet, and from there to become world leaders. Hence, for Japan, the war was a gift from the Gods.
The German reunification cost the West German citizens $1.9 Trillion over 20 years. East Germany was well behind West Germany in standard of living. However comparing South Korea—a very comfortable middle class society—with North Korea—an economic primitive basket case—produces a gap that is much wider, For example, East German infrastructure was not as well developed as West German infrastructure. North Korea has virtually no real infrastructure except a military one.
See Charles de Gaulle {138034} on the ephemeral nature of treaties.
This fact was one of the reasons that McCarthyism and HUAC were able to get traction. The Red Scare paranoids found something to really worry about. They overreacted, sensing the problem not as one of a large number of misguided and naïve people trying to help America do better, but as active spies controlled by the Kremlin who wanted to destroy the American way of life. There were two basic reasons these naïve officials acted that way. Many of them had not forgotten the devastation of the American people in the Great Depression and believed that capitalism had almost failed completely and the rough edge had to be taken off American capitalism by injecting some socialist principles such as stronger labor unions, ending racial and religious discrimination, controlling monopolies, and regulating critical industries. They also were mindful of the fact that the Russians were bearing the brunt of the WWII casualties—military and civilian—while killing more of the Germans and capturing more German occupied territory than the other allies together, yet they were not receiving the same level of assistance—technical, intelligence, economic and political as the British. They saw helping the Russians as saving American lives on the battlefield by making them more effective and keeping German soldiers and weapons away from the Western front and Americans. They also remembered that many in Congress were opposed to our entering WWII in Europe until Germany declared war on America. They had in many cases been apologists for Fascism and passionate enemies of communism. Some American industrialists like Henry Ford were anti-Semitic and overt admirers of Hitler. {586985} So these officials tried to redress the imbalance that existed while at the same time little was really known about Soviet Russia and the Stalin excesses that were as bad as some of Hitler’s. {634969} The only information Americans had were the terrible casualties the Russians were taking and the in kind that they were dishing out to the Germans. The number of Soviet spies in America were few and commensurate with the number of agents we had in Russia. But few Americans realized the difficulty the U. S. and the rest of the democratic world would have with Russia after the war was won.
James Robert Clapper Jr. is a retired lieutenant general in the United States Air Force and is the former Director of National Intelligence. Clapper has held several key positions within the United States Intelligence Community. He served as director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) from 1992 until 1995. He was the first director of defense intelligence within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and simultaneously the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. He served as the director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) from September 2001 until June 2006.