Henry L. Stimson Quotes
He [General George Marshall] brought up the event that we were likely to be attacked perhaps (as soon as) next Monday, for the Japanese are notorious for making an attack without warning, and the question was what we would do. The question was how we should maneuver them in to the position of firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves. It was a difficult proposition.
He was describing a meeting that he and General Marshall had conducted with FDR, Secretary of State Cordell Hull and others. In less than two weeks, the Japanese would attack Pearl Harbor without any declaration of war, as Marshall had predicted.
Henry L. Stimson, 1867-1950, U. S. Secretary of State (Republican), U. S. Secretary of War, Governor General, Philippine Islands, Diary Entry for November 25, 1941
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He was a strong believer in surprise attack and preemption.
Although the two men differed on a very important issue, each admired the other and acquitted themselves politely throughout. Congress explicitly gave the President the powers that he had exercised and won the dispute. But Dixon had also won, and upheld the law as it existed until it was changed.
Some say that President Roosevelt had instructed the war department to issue warnings to the military forces in the Philippines and the Pacific. Military intelligence argued against the Japanese attack on the Philippines—and did not think any attack anywhere very likely. When the president insisted, warnings went out and this is what was sent to General Short. The warning was ambiguous and Short did very little and was caught unprepared shortly thereafter. How much reliance should be placed on intelligence estimates has been a question that has been argued before World War II and after.
This issue of who has the wisdom and competency to determine policy in matters of war has been a constant one in most societies. Even in the Iraq war of the early 21st century, the Congress and the President argued as to what competence the Congress had to determine policy, strategy and tactics.
Prior to this the Japanese had not even considered what terms they might fight for if there were to be a peace negotiation. What the Japanese leadership apparently totally missed was the fact that President Roosevelt and all other American leaders throughout the war had promised that only unconditional surrender would be acceptable. This was reiterated in a Joint Declaration of the U. S. , China, and Great Britain. The Japanese thought this just propaganda and never took it seriously.
This quotation is important because the American public and their leaders saw only one course of action—invasion of the Japanese Mainland. The debate was whether to attempt the invasion right away or bomb and blockade Japan into destruction and starvation weakening the population so their resistance would not produce the kind of casualties that we had experienced with the Invasion of Okinawa. The bombing and blockade strategy was selected and 80 percent of Tokyo was obliterated. Yet the Japanese refused to surrender even after all its manufacturing capability was destroyed and the agriculture was beginning to be destroyed. Most Americans did not realize it but the atomic bomb was being made ready for use. After the test bomb in New Mexico, we had enough fissionable material for 2 bombs and it would take several months for each additional bomb. The use of the atomic bomb at the time seemed not much different from the massive bombing that had already taken place. More Japanese were killed in some of these conventional bombings than with the Atomic Bomb. The key believe was that the Japanese would not give up. After the first A bomb, they still would not surrender, and when the Emperor decided on surrender after the 2nd bomb, there was a military insurrection in the palace to stop the Emperor’s surrender message to the people from being broadcast. It was just minutes too late, and the Emperor had to be obeyed. Invasion, with its terrible casualties—many more than the atomic bombs—was unnecessary.
This was the 14th part of the Japanese reply to a previously made American peace proposal. The Japanese policy was to unite all of Asia into a co-prosperity sphere controlled by Japan where Japan would militarily conquer those Asian countries which did not “voluntarily” want to join. The Japanese were in the process of conquering China and the United States and Britain had embargoed oil and other material to Japan trying to pressure them to withdraw their troops from China and cease Japanese conquest by force. Japan believed that it was their right to conquer and control Asia and it was beneficial to the region, and that the U. S. and Britain had no right to curtail the expansion that Japan required to assure raw materials and other necessities. At the very time that these negotiations were on going, the Japanese fleet was sailing for the sneak attack on Pearl Harbor. The attack took place the very day this part of the Japanese reply was received.
The English were at War with Napoleon and Denmark was neutral. British leaders feared that Denmark might either ally themselves with Napoleon or provide him with ships from their well equipped fleet. The English decided on a preemptive attack on Denmark and military forces were ordered to Denmark. When they arrived, they were ordered to bombard Copenhagen and force the Danes to surrender. When this happened, the British seized the Danish ships and simply took them as war prizes. The issues of the morality and wisdom of preemptive attacks, as with the Americans in the Iraq war, was thoroughly debated but the government view prevailed to the shame of most Englishmen.
Henry Lewis Stimson was an American statesman, lawyer, and Republican Party politician. Over his long career, he emerged as a leading figure in U.S. foreign policy by serving in both Republican and Democratic administrations. He served as Secretary of War (1911–1913) under President William Howard Taft, Secretary of State (1929–1933) under President Herbert Hoover, and Secretary of War (1940–1945) under Presidents Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman.